Court/Tribunal: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Decision Title: Judgment
Chamber: The Appeals Chamber
Case Name: Justin Mugenzi, Prosper Mugiraneza v. Prosecution
Date: 4 February 2013
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Decision Background: The case comes on appeal from the Trial Chamber judgment, which found Mugenzi and Mugiraneza guilty of conspiracy to commit genocide, and direct and public incitement to commit genocide in Butare Prefecture in Rwanda. The Trial Court based its judgment on the defendants’ participation in the removal of Jean-Baptise Habyalimana, a Tutsi, as prefect of Butare, and their presence at a speech given Interim President Theodore Sindikubwabo which included inflammatory remarks against Tutsis.
The defendants appealed their convictions, asking the Appeals Chamber to acquit them or dismiss the indictment against them, or significantly reduce their sentences. The Prosecution argued that the defendants’ appeal should be dismissed entirely.
The defendants appealed their decision on both substantive and procedural grounds. Procedurally, they argued that the trial violated their rights to a fair trial due to undue delay, and the Prosecution’s violation of its disclosure obligations under Rule 68 of the Rules. More substantively, they argued that they were provided insufficient notice regarding the mode of liability sought by the Prosecution, and that the Trial Chamber erred in considering the requisite mens rea for the crimes charged by the Prosecution
Decision Review: The Appeals Chamber reviews only errors of law made by the Trial Court that have the potential to invalidate the lower court’s decision, or errors of fact that have occasioned a miscarriage of justice. When there is an error of law, the Appeals Chamber will apply the correct legal standard to the facts of the case. The Appeals Chamber does not lightly overturn a decision reached by the Trial Chamber.
The Appeals Chamber found that the proceedings against the defendants, all told, took approximately 12.5 years, and that the defendants were detained in custody for the duration of the proceedings. The defendants argued that this time lapse violated the right to trial without undue delay, and that it was caused by procedural missteps and prosecutorial negligence during trial. The defense further argued that the Trial Chamber, in reaching its ultimate decision, failed to adequately consider the charges of undue delay made by the defense. The Prosecution argued that the length of the trial was necessarily occasioned by the size and complexity of the case, and thus no violation of the right to a speedy trial occurred. It further argued that the Trial Chamber did appropriately consider the issues raised by the defense, and that the defense had not adequately pointed out any error in the Trial Chamber’s consideration or ultimate determination.
The Appeals Chamber recalled the rule governing undue delay, Article 20(4)(c) of the Statute. It recalled that a violation determination is made on a case-by-case basis, and is done so according to determining whether five factors are present. The Appeals Chamber agreed with the Prosecution and the Trial Chamber that the delays caused in the case were due to the case’s size and complexity. The Chamber noted that the case was one of the largest heard by the Tribunal, and that measured by pace-of-trial, was not dissimilar to other trials with multiple defendants. The Chamber also found the fact that some multi-defendant trials have moved at faster pace, not dispositive of the issue. The Appeals Chamber did not find that any decisions made by the Prosecution or Trial Chamber improperly contributed to the trial’s length. Further, the Appeals Chamber did not find that the Trial Chamber improperly or inadequately considered these claims.
The defendants next argued that the Prosecution violated its Rule 68 duty to disclose any exculpatory information it has in its possession. Specifically, the defendants sought certain evidence from other Rwanda trials, which the defendants argued was relevant to the reasons behind the removal of Habyalimana’s as prefect. They argued that the material would tend to show that his removal was done for administrative reasons, and not to facilitate the murder of Tutsi civilians, as the Prosecution contended.
The Rule requires that the defense specifically identify the material sought, make a prima facie case of the evidence’s exculpatory nature, and prove that the material is in the Prosecution’s control. The Prosecution is found to have failed in its disclosure obligations, the Chamber will determine whether the Defense have been prejudiced by the failure-to-disclose before it will fashion a remedy.
The Prosecution acknowledged that it had the requested testimony in its possession, and that it should have turned it over. It argued, however, that its failure to turn over the materials was due to a mistake in identifying the material, and not due to any bad faith on the Prosecution’s part.
The Appeals Chamber was satisfied that the defendants showed that the Prosecution breached its disclosure duties under the elements announced in Rule 68. The Chamber, however, found that the requested material was both consistent with factual findings made by the Trial Chamber against the defendants, and cumulative of other evidence presented at trial. The Chamber thus found that any prejudice against the defendants was minimal, and did not materially affect the case against them. Thus, it found that no relief was warranted. The Appeals Chamber, however, did note that throughout the trial the Prosecution breached its Rule 68 duties on a number of occasions, and that the Trial Chamber had called its continued breaches “inexcusable.” The Appeals Chamber found that the repeated violations impacted the proceedings and prejudiced the interests of justice. The Chamber “firmly reminded” the Prosecution of its duties under Rule 68.
The Indictment charged the defendants with conspiracy to commit genocide. Mugiraneza argued that the crime for which he was convicted ultimately differed from that charged, and that the indictment fails to allege any actions personally taken by him in connection with the charged crime. He also argued that a conviction for conspiracy to commit genocide could not be had under a joint criminal enterprise theory, as was found in his case.
The Appeals Chamber found that the Indictment adequately put the defendant on notice of the specific acts for which he was being accused – namely the removal of Habyalimana as prefect. It also found that the indictment adequately put the defendant on notice that he was being charged with conspiracy to commit genocide.
Finally, the defendants argued that the Trial Chamber erred in finding the requisite mens rea for the charged crimes – conspiracy to commit genocide and incitement to genocide. Specifically, the defendants argued that the fact that they participated in the removal of Habyalimana did not necessarily evidence an intent to commit genocide, and the fact that they attended the speech given by the Interim President could not be construed to suggest that they intended to or knowledgably engaged in incitement to genocide.
The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber convicted the defendants on the conspiracy to commit genocide count from circumstantial evidence – namely, the Trial Court found that Habyalimana’s removal was done so that a political obstacle to killing of Tutsi civilians would be removed. They necessarily assumed that the primary motivating factor behind the removal was the furtherance of genocide, and convicted accordingly. The Appeals Chamber noted that a conspiracy to commit genocide can be found from circumstantial evidence, but when an inference of guilt is based on circumstantial evidence, that inference must be the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence.
The Appeals Chamber noted that evidence at trial suggested administrative reasons for Habyalimana’s removal as prefect – namely, a number of specific instances where he failed to adequately perform his job or meet his obligations as prefect. The Appeals Chamber noted that this, as the defense contended, could be a reasonable and primary reason for his removal. Thus the Appeals Chamber was not convinced that the Prosecution had met its burden to show that the genocidal reason for his removal was the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the evidence. Thus, it found that the Trial Chamber could not sufficiently found that the defendants, in light of the alternative explanation for Habyalimana’s removal, possessed the mens rea for conspiracy to commit genocide.
The Appeals Chamber also found that the Trial Chamber lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis to find that the defendants possessed the necessary mens rea for incitement to genocide. The basis for the defendant’s conviction was their presence at the inflammatory speech given by the Interim Rwandan President during the installation of the new prefect of Butare. The Appeals Chamber noted that evidence was presented suggesting that it was customary for officials of the defendant’s positions to attend such events, such that their presence was not necessarily unexpected or indicative of any particular agreement with the proceedings.
Likewise, the Appeals Chamber found that no evidence suggested that the defendants knew of or agreed with the contents of the Interim President’s speech – essentially, that they did not know what he was going to say ahead of time, such that their presence at the event could not be construed as agreement with the content of the speech. The Prosecution and the Trial Court found it dispositive that one of the defendants did not renounce the Interim President’s inflammatory ideas in their own speech at the event; the Appeals Court noted that the defendant’s speech preceded the Interim President’s, such that he could not have rebutted or refuted the ideas had he wanted to. Thus, the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber could not have adequately found that the defendants possessed the adequate or actual mens rea to incite the public to genocide.
Based on the foregoing, the Appeal Chamber reversed the defendants’ convictions for conspiracy to commit genocide and for direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and entered judgments of acquittal.
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